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Abstract 
Megaprojects are frequently delivered with very poor project management performance. Poor performance consists of cost and 
time escalation, poor outcome quality and shortfall benefits. This is due to several reasons such as intrinsic complexity, biased 
forecasts, conscious misinformation about costs and benefits, poor stakeholder management. Concerning project stakeholders 
there are three main criticalities: (1) opportunistic behaviour; (2) lack of skills and know-how; and (3) poor communication and 
coordination.  
Systems Engineering (SE) is both a technical and managerial approach to manage complex projects, in particular megaprojects. 
SE can enable project managers to properly manage stakeholders optimizing the trade-off between a short project planning and 
a detailed holistic stakeholder analysis. The purpose of this paper is to present a framework enabling managers:  (1) to select 
and manage suppliers in order to enforce supplier coordination and to prevent opportunistic behaviour; and (2) to decide how to 
involve suppliers in different projects, present or future, considering past projects performance. 
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1 Introduction 
Megaprojects have frequently very poor project management performance: cost and time escalations, poor 
outcome quality, shortfall benefits. (Flyvbjerg, 2007) focuses on cost escalation, identifying three main types of 
explanations: (1) Technical; (2) Psychological and (3) Political. Other scholars (Marrewijk, Clegg, Pitsis, & 
Veenswijk, 2008) suggest that megaprojects poor performance are due their intrinsic characteristics (uncertainty, 
high complexity, high risk, huge project size, large variety and number of people involved, political influence, etc). 
In addition decision makers operate with limited rationality and decisions are based on incomplete information or 
wrong data.   
Some examples of megaprojects delivered with poor performance are:  
(1) The Hong Kong international airport (Davies, Gann, & Douglas, 2009). The ambition of authorities to 
inaugurate the Hong Kong international airport on time makes them to open the airport although it was not 
ready. This caused the cargo chaos and flight displays disasters.  To overcome such problems it was necessary 
to find additional funds, which caused globally the national deficit of GDP of 0.22 %. 
(2) The Big Dig project in Boston (Attorney General of Massachusetts, 2008). The objective was to restructure 
highways and tunnels in Boston. The project finished in litigation due to very poor performance because of the 
very high cost escalation (from the initial US $ 2.8 to final US $ 14.8), delay (total of 9 years - mostly because 
of the many leaks found) and the fatal accident in the William Ted Tunnel. The Massachusetts prosecutor 
ordered a judicial investigations and discovered that intentional fraud, lack of technical knowledge and know-
how, poor stakeholders coordination were the main causes of poor performance.   
(3) The Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant (Ross & Staw, 1993). This project registered continuous cost escalation, 
mainly because biased optimism. The final cost was US $ 5.5 billion, instead of initial cost of US $ 75million. 
The power plant has never been operated. 
System Engineering (SE) is a both managerial and technical approach to manage big, complex and risky projects. 
This paper fits in this research stream presenting a framework (integrated within SE project management approach) 
to strengthen collaboration among stakeholders and in particular between main contractors and suppliers. The 
benefits of adopting this model are: (1) to reduce technology and supply risks; (2) to reduce the opportunistic 
behaviour of suppliers; (3) to improve supplier commitment and performance.
The paper is organized as follow. Section 2 deals with literature review: (i) megaproject, (ii) Systems Engineering 
approach; and (iii) project stakeholder management with a particular attention to suppliers. Section 3 presents a SE 
framework for supplier management within a megaproject. Section 4 discusses and summarises the main findings 
and contributions of this paper. 
2 Literature Review 
2.1 Megaproject 
(Marrewijk, Clegg, Pitsis, & Veenswijk, 2008) define “mega” those projects characterised by: (1) initial 
investments over $ 1B; (2) significant complexity (i.e. technology used, project size) and (3) high inherent risk. 
Cost escalation due to poor performance of megaprojects could be very high bringing to company bankruptcy 
(Brealey, Cooper, & Habib, 2000) or significant deficit on the national Balance of Payment (Steinberg, 1987). 
Summarising the contributions of different authors discussed in the introduction, it is possible to conclude that 
megaprojects have poor performance mainly because: (1) inherent higher risk and uncertainty; (2) high project 
complexity; (3) misinformation; (4) political influence. Empirical studies show that both public and private 
megaprojects register poor performance (Flyvbjerg, 2007), (Locatelli & Mancini, 2012a). Megaprojects are usually 
commissioned by governments and delivered by private organizations into a Public Private Partnerships (Brealey, 
Cooper, & Habib, 2000) (Locatelli & Mancini, 2010). These private organizations, commonly known as 
Engineering, Procurement and Constructions (EPC) companies are huge projects-based companies ( (Locatelli & 
Mancini, 2012b). These companies collect and manage projects at different levels namely portfolio, programme 
and project levels. At the portfolio level the main objective is to optimise the allocation of scarce resources (i.e. 
budgets, skills) to different projects, while at the project level the main objective is to make an efficient use those 
resources (Hobday, 2000). 
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2.2 Systems Engineering  
There are available many approaches and standards to run megaprojects: 
• PMI Body Of Knowledge (PMI, 2008). It focuses mostly on managerial processes. It is mainly developed for 
“standard” project (better if managed by companies with strong process oriented culture like the north-
American). It is suitable for projects such as Olympic Game organization, new product development, 
organizational process engineering, but it is less efficient with big and complex projects (i.e. nuclear power 
plants, large dams, large bridge, highways, etc.) 
• IPMA Competence Baseline. It focuses mostly on overall social and managerial aspects of competences 
needed to manage projects. It covers a wider range of potential users (no matter on their culture) but it is not 
specific for megaprojects. 
• Waterfall model (Royce, 1970). It is a sequential approach, where an activity must be completed before the 
next is started. The best application is on small and not complex projects. It presents many limits on project 
risk management. It has more managerial prospective than technical. 
• Spiral model (Boehm, 1988). It is dynamic approach, more efficient than the waterfall model to cope with 
complex project and high inherent risk. It is common for IT projects. 
• Systems Engineering (SE) (INCOSE, 2006). SE is both a managerial and a technical approach to manage 
complex systems such as engineering and construction megaprojects. It has been developed to manage large 
and complex projects (Locatelli, et al., 2013). Therefore SE is the starting point for the analysis presented in 
this paper. 
The cornerstone of SE is the careful identification and analysis of stakeholder requirements. It is based on 
continuous system integration, verification and validation processes in order to anticipate constraints and 
integration problems. To understand the reasons of this latter success the key question is: how the SE approach 
defined by the standard ISO/IEC 15288 differs from traditional one? The success factor is the shift from a single 
project prospective to a portfolio perspective, as it is shown in Fig. 1. In fact, in order to deal with project-based 
organizations context, this standard provides additional processes: Enterprise and Agreement Processes, and 
Organizational Project-Enabling Processes.  
The International Council on Systems Engineering (INCOSE) is a non-profit organization aimed to promote the SE 
application into industry, academia and government (INCOSE, 2006). Nowadays one of INCOSE most important 
driver is to move from a single project view to a portfolio prospective. Under this perspective the standards still 
miss a formal stakeholder management framework. This paper aims to fill that gap.  
Fig. 1: SE approach shift on prospective level, from (INCOSE, 2006). 
2.3 Project Stakeholders  
In recent years there has been a great interest in stakeholder theory with a proliferation of scientific papers as 
analysed in (Littau.P, Jujagiri, & Adlbrecht, 2010). Stakeholder theory was formally established in 1984 with the 
publication of “Strategic Management: A stakeholder Approach” by Freeman (Freeman, 1984). A good synthesis 
of the major stakeholder models is on (Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997). A specific research on project stakeholders 
is presented in (Aaltonen, 2010). 
Agent-principal theory is a good reference to analyse stakeholder interdependence and prevent conflicts. Agency 
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theory is defined as a relationship on which a one person (the principal) engages another person (the agent) to 
perform some services on his behalf. The key point of agency theory is the assumption that the interests of 
principles and agents diverge. Differently to traditional agent-principal theory, stakeholder-agency theory, defined 
by (Hill & Jones, 1992), admits market disequilibrium in the short and medium run. As a consequence there is a 
power differentiation or unequal distribution of power between the “principal” and the “agent”. For example, a 
given stakeholder could accept the contract under certain conditions, aware that after the agreement he will ask for 
changes (Brouthers & Bamossy, 1997). In fact, once the contract is signed and the project is started, the 
counterpart is obliged to come to a compromise in order to get the project finished. The key point is that the 
stakeholder controls one or more key resources (i.e. licence authorization, funds) the counterpart has few or no 
alternative in the short-medium run to acquire such resource from an alternative font. Such situations are common 
in the EPC industry (Ruuska, Ahola, Artto, Locatelli, & Mancini, 2011). 
Given the huge variety and number of stakeholders involved in megaprojects, this paper focuses on suppliers 
because are often one of the most salient and critical stakeholders. 
In general terms, supplier selection process consists of four main steps (Boer de, Labro, & Morlacchi, 2001): (1) 
problem definition, make or buy decision; (2) formulation of criteria and techniques to select suppliers; (3) 
qualification, to sort potential suppliers who respect given preconditions; and (4) choice, selection of the best 
alternative. Among supplier selection techniques, the most common are: linear weighting models (i.e. simulation-
based techniques, AHP, conjoint analysis – (Locatelli, G; Mancini, M., 2012c)); total cost of ownership models; 
mathematical programming models. (Micheli, Cagno, & DiGiulio, 2009) define a risk-based supplier selection 
method specific for EPC industry. Supplier selection process includes also analysis of items criticality (strategic 
versus no critical) and market condition (legal or de facto monopoly or competitive market) (Kraljic, 1983). It is 
important to pinpoint that in the EPC industry not all suppliers are selected by the EPC. Project managers could be 
obliged to use particular supplier because of: (1) by contractual constrains, for example only local suppliers; (2) on 
the marketplace there few skilled suppliers (new technology); (3) supplier to be used must be certified (e.g. N-
STAMP for Nuclear sectors), etc. Another important aspect while dealing with suppliers in engineering and 
construction megaprojects is the supplier performance evaluation. Supplier performance is measured with different 
criteria. Besides the traditional performance criteria managed by the procurement office (cost, delivery, quality), 
other criteria must be included in supplier evaluation to ensure safety for people and assets, limited environmental 
impact, reliability and maintenance facilities, etc. 
The literature shows as SE is an efficient methodology to reduce the risk in very complex megaprojects. However 
the state of the art of SE approach still misses a formal process to manage stakeholders. This paper fills this gap 
proposing a SE management process to: (1) reduce suppliers’ opportunistic behaviour; (2) overcome lack of skills 
and know-how through close collaboration with key suppliers; and (3) to improve communication and 
coordination throughout the different organizational level and improve suppliers’ performance. 
This new process could be added to the enterprise process defined by (INCOSE, 2006). The inputs of the process 
are: strategic guidelines for supplier management; analysis of items criticality; analysis of marketplace context; 
stakeholder network. The outputs are: selected suppliers; evaluation of commitment to deserve to each supplier; 
supplier and stakeholder network analysis; supplier satisfaction measurement (tools, methodologies, etc.); 
suppliers ranking (from excellent to inadequate ones); updated vendor list; evaluation of supplier partnership 
opportunity (cost and benefits analysis).  
2.4 Supplier Selection 
In literature supplier selection processes are usually generic for all types of industries. During the supplier selection 
process, decision makers need to identify all suppliers’ requirements. Requirements are distinct in: (1) technical, 
(2) expectation and (3) opportunistic interests or personal goals. SE is suitable to identify technical requirements 
and we propose to adopt different types of variables for different types of requirement in order to check 
completeness of supplier requirements. In particular we propose fuzzy variables (Zadeh, 1975), which are efficient 
to deal with not well defined requirements such as expectations and opportunistic interests. The variables are: (1) 
numerical variable for explicit requirements, which must be clear as much as possible; (2) numerical fuzzy 
variables for implicit stakeholders requirements and needs; and (3) linguistic fuzzy variables to identify supplier 
opportunistic interests. While identifying supplier opportunistic interests (i.e. opportunity to acquire new 
competence and know-how or to have an international experience) project managers could refer to the Maslow‘s 
514   Giorgio Locatelli et al. /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  119 ( 2014 )  510 – 518 
needs hierarchy (Maslow, 1943) for supplier as individual or the Organization Lifecycle Theory (Littau.P, Jujagiri, 
& Adlbrecht, 2010) for supplier as a company.  
The output of this process is a matrix (see Fig. 2), based on requirement typology (horizontal axis) and variable 
typology (vertical axis). In this matrix, dark grey cells might be empty. Requirements inside these cells belong to 
other cells and must be formalised. Light grey cells need more information to be completed; and in the white cells 
there are well defined requirement, to be confirmed and validated. This matrix enables project managers to control 
the completeness of supplier requirements, identifying which requirements are clear and well defined and which 
need additional information. This matrix could be used whenever it is necessary to identify or update suppliers’ 
requirements, for example at the beginning of the project or when there are new suppliers or there is change in the 
supplier network. 
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Fig. 2: Requirement typology and variable typology matrix. 
Once identified all supplier requirements it is necessary to understand to what extent such requirements are 
consistent with the project goals. For this purpose, we distinguish requirements into: (1) consistent requirements, 
satisfaction of these requirements enables to meet project goals; (2) inconsistent but compatible requirements, 
satisfaction of these requirements does not compromise the objective to meet project goals, even if it could 
potentially occur; and (3) inconsistent and incompatible requirements, satisfaction of these requirements 
automatically compromise the purpose to meet project goals. 
To conclude, managers might combine the requirement analysis with the supplier criticality analysis. Supplier 
criticality analysis is based on items’ criticality and market conditions, using for example the (Kraljic, 1983) 
framework. 
From this analysis, the decision maker could understand: 
• which suppliers are important;  
• how much attention must be devoted to different suppliers; 
• the mutual dependence with critical suppliers; 
• the consistence of supplier interests with the megaproject goals; 
• the level of completeness of supplier requirements.
2.5 Supplier Performance Evaluation 
Ability to select suppliers as in the standard supplier selection process is not enough while dealing with 
megaprojects. Given the huge impact of megaprojects on the society and environment, suppliers must ensure 
(besides the usual performance on cost, time and quality) safety for people and assets, limited environmental 
impact, maintenance facilities, etc. Therefore, suppliers performance evaluation is not limited to the suppliers 
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selection process, but it an on-going process throughout the project lifecycle and in particular during the 
construction and installation stage and the release stage. 
In the EPC companies, managers generally suffer poor communication among different organizational levels, for 
example between project level and portfolio level. To overcome this criticality, this paper proposes the use of the 
PDCA (Plan-Do-Check-Act) cycle (Deming, 1986). This well proven managerial tool enables a constant, 
systematic and rigorous evaluation of supplier performance and, at the same time, improves communication 
between different organizational levels (see Figure 3). In this prospective, information from the project level 
(operational level) could support decisions at the portfolio level (strategic level) to define a more efficient 
purchasing strategy, coherent with supplier performance and market conditions. The targets are: 
1. to involve suppliers with good performance in other projects of the portfolio; 
2. to eliminate from the vendor list suppliers with poor performance (when possible). 
Figure 3 : The PDCA cycle, a bridge between project level and portfolio level. 
Projects are often managed by “decision gates”. In decision gates (defined in the SE processes “Organizational 
Project-Enabling” (INCOSE, 2006)) project managers take go/non go decision. They analyse project performance 
to control if the work done is consistent with the project scope and schedule or if the project needs correction. 
Supported by the decision gates managerial approach, the PDCA cycle can be implemented as follow:  
i. To start, at the Plan phase, project managers decide the activities to do. Then project team pursues the 
implementation of such activities in the Do phase. Now, the suggestion is to make the Check phase of the 
PDCA cycle corresponding to decision gates. So at each decision gate, project managers, cooperating with 
the purchasing office (agreement processes) and project team members, evaluate the single supplier 
performance considering contextual factors of the megaproject. They evaluate the necessity for corrective 
action in the Act phase.  
ii. Later on, the project manager sends his analysis to the program manager. This must combine analysis of all 
projects program.  
iii. Finally all program managers send their analysis to the portfolio manager to support purchasing strategic 
decisions. 
The first goal, at project level, is to evaluate suppliers’ performance. For suppliers with poor performance, project 
manager makes a cost-benefit analysis to substitute them. For obliged suppliers, in case of poor performance, the 
strategy is based on damages limitation. At least, partnership collaboration could be considered in the prospective 
to support the supplier in improving his performance. 
The second goal, at portfolio level, is to define if best suppliers could become business partners. In this case, it is 
crucial to create the conditions for partnership collaboration. For suppliers with poor performance, portfolio 
manager progressively reduces their involvement in the business company, till arriving to their elimination from 
the vendor list (when possible). 
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2.6 Supplier Satisfaction 
To undertake a successful, efficient and long term partnership satisfaction of both partners is essential (Essig & 
Amann, 2009). Historically academics and managers mattered on buyer satisfaction ignoring supplier satisfaction 
(Meena & Sarmah, 2012). The framework addresses this gap in the EPC industry. For this purpose, firstly, we 
identify which factors influence supplier satisfaction, then, we identify a tool to measure such satisfaction. 
Supplier satisfaction is defined as “the feeling of equity with the relationship no matter what power imbalance 
exists” (Benton & Maloni, 2005). In the long term, suppliers are mostly interested in three main objectives: (1) 
financial; (2) technology knowledge; and (3) business reputation. We identify three factors which influence 
supplier satisfaction: 
• Economic (E). It measures economic and financial opportunities the supplier perceives from the suppliers, 
now and in the future. 
• Communication (C). It measures how much the two organizations are integrated (organizational culture, IT 
systems, quality standards, etc). It measures also the buyers and engineers’ competence (numbers of 
modification, ri-negotiation of orders conditions, and modification of technical requirements). It includes 
analysis of how much buyers are rapid to furnish communication and answer to suppliers and the 
completeness of such communication. 
• Innovation and knowledge Opportunity (O). It measures opportunity for knowledge creation and sharing, 
technical know-how acquisition, product innovation, ability for better risk management and complexity 
management, ability of customer to manage contingencies. 
To measure supplier satisfaction, this paper proposes a Supplier-Satisfaction-Index (SSI) based on the three 
factors. For each factor, we identify 10 indicators, summarised in Appendix A. Each indicator has value on the 
range 0-10, where 0 stands for very unsatisfied and 10 for very satisfied 
The index is: SSI= ĮE + ȕC + ȖO,  (with Į+ȕ+Ȗ=1).  
Since suppliers are not all equal, the definition of the index includes three parameters, alpha, beta and gamma, 
which reflect the importance of the single supplier to the buyer. For example, using the (Kraljic, 1983) 
terminology, for a strategic-supplier the parameter gamma is the most important for the buyer. Co-design 
collaboration is essential to meet buyer objectives. The buyer might ensure the supplier satisfaction and 
commitment to his job. In a relationship with a bottleneck-supplier, the bargaining power is on the supplier side 
and at the same time the item supplied is not technically critical to the buyer. So the buyer might ensure a good 
communication (parameter beta) with the supplier to avoid tension with the supplier, who has less interest in the 
relation. For a non-critical-supplier or leverage-supplier, parameter alpha will have major weigh. This kind of 
supplier cares mostly on economic issues rather than communication and innovation and knowledge opportunities. 
The overall framework allows manager to understand the weak points in their relationship with suppliers. Through 
statistical analysis managers can understand if poor performance on some indicators is specific for a certain 
supplier only or if it is common to many suppliers. This index enables an indirect employees’ performance 
measurement. The index can be used in two ways: (1) the buyer defines the weight of the parameters while the 
supplier defines the indicators; or (2) both the parameters and the indicators are made by the supplier. 
3 Conclusion 
The contribution of this paper is the formal introduction of supplier management process, with a portfolio 
perspective, in the SE approach (INCOSE views). This process consists of: (1) Supplier selection; (2) Supplier 
performance evaluation and (3) Supplier satisfaction analysis. In particular for supplier performance evaluation we 
tailored the PDCA cycle to capture information about operational performance at project level and transfer such 
information to portfolio level. Here, this information contributes to make decision on purchasing strategy, coherent 
with supplier performance, item criticality and market condition. In order to reduce project risk and opportunistic 
behaviour, opportunities for business partnership are assessed. We defined a supplier satisfaction index, to improve 
supplier commitment and performance. 
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APPENDIX A 
Factors Indicators Indicators Description 
Ec
o
n
o
m
ic
 
 
Business experiences Many years of business experience offers opportunities of technical know-how and managerial 
skills acquisition  
Customer business 
reputation 
Good reputation of buyers increases supplier reputation, facilities access to new market and to 
financials funds 
Customer size A big customer has more business opportunities in terms of volume purchased, offers major 
business opportunities in the future 
Customer social reputation Customer social reputation could potentially improve supplier social status. For example customers 
with good relationships with politicians or banks, could be a positive reference to the suppliers 
Grade of 
internationalization 
International customer could enable access to foreign market at a minor cost. He could be a 
guarantee to new customer or business relationship 
Payment condition Equity on the definition of payment condition 
Perceived business 
opportunities 
It measure present business opportunities the supplier think he could take advantage from his 
customer. While strategic value is projected on the future, perceived business opportunities focus 
on present or on short run opportunities 
Strategic  value It measure business opportunities related to the partnership (access to new market, technology 
know-how acquisition) in the long run 
Time delivery Buyers makes orders with sufficient time to supplier to organize him self 
Willingness to invest in 
partnership 
It measures how much a supplier is inclined or, symmetrically, he is reluctant to partnership with 
customer 
C
o
m
m
u
n
ic
a
tio
n
 
Ability to solve conflict Ability of buyer to solve conflict in an equity way, without abusing of his position and power 
within a win-win approach. 
Commercial clarity in 
order 
Ability of buyer to define clearly all aspects of a commercial order (time delivery, payment 
condition, quality control responsibility, supply risk reasonability, etc) 
Cost of integration with 
the customer  
It analyses all cost related to the partnership. For example, employees ‘training,  IT system 
integration, commitment for organizational culture change 
Customer faithful Supplier trusts the buyer honesty, during and after the negotiation process 
Customer Personnel 
courtesy and reliability 
It measure politeness through customer’s employees relate with supplier ‘employees  
Number of strategic 
contacts 
Not all contacts between buyer and supplier are value creation. For a raw materials supplier, few 
contacts are sufficient. A lot of contact could be just irksome. While for high-tech supplier, need 
more interactions for a good co-design outcome. Buyers must optimize the number of contact with 
supplier, not too much to be irksome and too few to be insufficient. 
Quality of Communication It measure clarity of communication (i.e. the need, quantification, quality, etc) 
Response Time It measures the time customer uses top respond to supplier 
Technical clarity in order Ability of buyer to define clearly all aspects of a technical order (technical specifications, quality 
standard, etc) 
Willingness for product 
design or process 
improvement suggestion 
It measures the degree on which customer take seriously into consideration supplier’s suggestion 
to improve product design or production process.  
Te
ch
n
o
lo
gy
 
Equal technology risk 
sharing 
It measures how much the technology risk is distributed between supplier and buyer, for example 
if the buyer tends to transfer completely such risk to the supplier 
Frequency of design 
modification 
How mush buyer’ engineers ask for design modification due to insufficient technical requirements 
definition, poor technical communication, not completely understood technical requirements   
Intensity of integration 
with R&D 
It measures the degree of integration between buyer and suppliers in terms of IT systems, 
competence and formation,  availability general tools and resources to enable such integration  
New knowledge creation Ability to create, capture and share knowledge 
Proactive approach to 
collaboration 
It measure preparations and commitment of customer employees to collaborate with suppliers 
Solve-problem technical 
ability 
Ability and experience to solve technical problem (time, quality of solution) 
Technical competence It measures technical competence and skill of buyer’ engineers; technology competence of the 
buyer; access to new technology 
Technical competence of 
purchasing personnel 
 Ability of the purchasing personnel to understand the technical criticality of what they are 
purchasing 
Technical requirement 
definitions  
Ability to define technical requirement in exhaustive way, clear and complete 
Technology compatibility 
and complementary   
It measures how much the two organization are technologically compatible (i.e. IT systems 
integration) and complementary (i.e. customer is software skills and the supplier hardware. 
